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Introduction
Plato’s core metaphysical intuition is that transcendent properties—the Forms—are 
responsible for things being quali!ed in the way they are. "ese transcendent proper-
ties are universal in the sense that many individuals “partake” in each of the transcend-
ent properties, at a time. Partaking in any one Form quali!es the partaking individual 
with the property that Form is; thus, an individual is courageous by partaking in the 
Form of Courage. "e intuition is that the property of courageousness comes to be 
present in the individual by partaking in the Form (however “partaking” is interpreted 
ontologically). Since each Form stands for a single property (it is monoeidic), partaking 
in a Form quali!es the individual with that property.1
An ontological theory needs to account for not only quali!ed individuals, but also 
for related individuals. Related individuals have been a thorny issue for Plato’s "eory 
of Forms, because the theory does not prima facie seem to be designed to o#er an 
ontology of related individuals, since it, strikingly, does not contain any relational 
Forms. Nevertheless, Plato was aware of the need for an explanation, and so did attempt 
to account for related individuals through his "eory of Forms. What I aim to show in 
this chapter is that there is a metaphysically deeply insightful background regarding 
participation, in his "eory of Forms, which can help us understand how Plato 
accounts for related individuals without relational Forms.
Plato’s solution could not have been the introduction of relational Forms in his 
ontology. "is is because partaking in a Form quali!es an individual only with the 
1 Part of the work for this chapter took place at the Bellagio Study Center, Rockefeller Foundation, sup-
ported by a grant from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland; I am thankful to the foundations 
for their support. I would like to also thank the organizers and the participants of the Semantics and 
Philosophy in Europe 5 conference for their useful discussion on an earlier version of the chapter presented 
at the conference. And !nally I would like to thank the anonymous referees of the volume for their con-
structive criticisms. "e present chapter is a revised version of my “Relations as Plural-Predications in 
Plato” in Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (2013)/1 with the kind permission of the Editor.
1
Relations as Plural-Predications  
in Plato
!eodore Scaltsas
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4 Theodore Scaltsas
property the Form stands for. But asymmetric relations, such as the mother–daughter 
relation, involve the quali!cation of two (or more) individuals with di"erent properties 
each. "ere could be no Form partaking in which would qualify di#erent individuals 
with di#erent properties; for example, no maternal-relational Form, such that if two 
individuals partook of it, one individual would be quali!ed as mother and the other as 
o#spring. I will argue that Plato’s theory of plural-partaking in Forms, which he devel-
oped in one of his early dialogues, the Hippias Major, can help us understand his 
account of related individuals through the Forms of Opposites.
On his account of plural-predication, two or more individuals can partake in a Form 
as plural-subjects, and come to be jointly quali!ed by a single instance of the property of 
the Form; for example, Michael and George, acting jointly, are courageous. Remarkably, 
Plato was insightful enough to see and show in his theory that this does not make Michael 
courageous or George courageous, but only both of them together courageous. I aim to 
show that plural-partaking can shed light on Plato’s problematic account of how related 
objects acquire their relational quali#cations, without relations as additional entities 
between individuals. "e related individuals share a monadic property instance in sym-
metric cases or a pair of property instances in asymmetric cases. Neither the shared prop-
erty nor the shared pair of properties is a relational bridge between the plural- subjects, 
but a quali!cation of the subjects like any monadic quali!cation of an object. "e subjects 
are conjoined in sharing this instance of a property, which is attained by the joint partak-
ing in the Form (dictated by the relativizing context, as in being equal to or greater than, 
etc.). "e joint-partaking does not turn the subjects into one, but retains the plurality of 
the subjects. Rather than requiring the oneness of the subjects, plural-partaking fur-
nishes the sharing of the instance of the property between the subjects, which perform 
jointly the metaphysical function of partaking. We shall !rst turn to Plato’s theory of 
plural subjects and plural-partaking in Forms, and then come to examine how (symmet-
rically and asymmetrically) related individuals can be thought of as partaking plurally.2
Plural subjects and plural-partaking in Platonic Forms
In Plato’s dialogue Hippias Major, the sophist Hippias, in his exchange with Socrates, 
claims there is only distributive predication to many:
Never shall you !nd what is attributed to neither me nor you, but is attributed to both of us. If 
both of us were just, wouldn’t each of us be too? Or if each of us were unjust, wouldn’t both of 
us? Or if we were healthy, wouldn’t each be? . . . You Socrates think there’s some attribute or 
being that is true of these both but not of each, or of each but not of both. And how could that 
be, Socrates? "at when neither has an attribute, whatever it may be, this attribute—which 
2 I am grateful to Øystein Linnebo for pointing out possible connections of this account to concerns 
about asymmetric relations discussed by Kit Fine, Tim Williamson, and Cian Dorr. I note here, but will not 
explore the possible relevance to the following works: Timothy Williamson, “Converse Relations,” !e 
Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 249–62; Kit Fine, “Neutral Relations,” !e Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 
1–33; Dorr Cian, “Non-Symmetric Relations,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (2004): 155–92.
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Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato 5
belongs to neither—could belong to both? . . . whatever both are, each is as well; and whatever 
each is, both are. (Hippias Major 300 d 7–301 e 5)
I take Hippias’s position to be that the many are f if and only if each of the many is f. 
I take this position to be the rejection of plural-predication, in the way that such predi-
cation is described by Hippias and ascribed to Socrates by him. For Hippias there is no 
shared attribute between the many over and above the individual possessions of attrib-
utes by each of the many; their collective quali!cation reduces to individual quali!ca-
tions; I shall call this distributive-predication. "ings are quali!ed in a particular way if 
they are each so quali!ed, and vice versa.
Socrates agrees that there are cases like the ones that Hippias mentions. But addi-
tionally, Socrates puts forward counterexamples to Hippias’s theory and proposes an 
account that o#ers the ontology required for his counterexamples. "e di#erence 
between the accounts is that Socrates does not reduce, in all cases, the collective quali-
!cation of the many to their individual possessions of that attribute, as Hippias does. 
Socrates allows for two further types of quali!cation. For him, an attribute can belong 
to all the many for independent reasons than the reasons for which it belongs to each of 
the many, or it may even not belong to each of the many at all; the instance of the attrib-
ute which is shared by the many is di#erent from any instance that may belong to each 
of the many. So there are three types of predication: one distributive (Hippias’s) and two 
plural ones (Socrates’). "e distributive one is when the many are collectively quali!ed 
simply because each of the many possesses that attribute. "e plural ones are, !rst, 
when an attribute is shared by all the many in addition to each of the many possessing 
that attribute; and, second, when an attribute is shared by all the many while none of 
the many possesses that attribute. But for simplicity’s sake I will divide them into two 
only camps, one where the many are quali!ed and each of the many is also quali!ed, 
and one where the many are quali!ed but each of the many is not (or vice versa). (So I 
will not systematically distinguish between the many being quali!ed because each is 
quali!ed, and the many being quali!ed because they share an instance of the attribute 
over and above each possessing that attribute. "e Platonic text also sets up the debate 
as a dichotomy rather than a trichotomy, for starkness of opposition between the two 
theories.) So Hippias and Socrates agree that when each of the many is f, then all are f, 
too; they disagree on whether the many can be f when none of the many is f.
Socrates’ counterexamples show de!nitively that there are cases which cannot be 
explained by Hippias’s theory of distributed predication. He argues as follows (with a 
touch of Socratic irony):
SOCRATES: We were so foolish, my friend, before you [Hippias] said what you did, that we 
had an opinion about me and you that each of us is one, but that we would not both be one 
(which is what each of us would be) because we are not one but two. But now, we have been 
instructed by you that if two is what we both are, two is what each of us must be as well; and if 
each is one, then both must be one as well. . . . "en it’s not entirely necessary, as you [Hippias] 
said it was a moment ago, that whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever 
is true of each is also true of both. (Hippias Major 301 d 5–302 b 3)
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"is example makes it clear that Hippias does not have the distributive way out here. 
Even if we could say that David and Susan are one (not “two”), it would not be true to 
conclude from this that David is one and Susan is one in the same sense of “one” as 
each is one. "e predicate “one” in these statements means something di#erent: in the 
former it may mean something like “inseparable between them,” while in the latter it 
would mean “one human being.” Neither is the predication “they are two” distributive; 
David is not two, nor is Susan, despite the fact that they are two.
Socrates’ initial counterexample to Hippias’s assumption about distributive predica-
tion, namely the example of “being two,” is the simplest to examine. Each of Socrates 
and Hippias is a one, while they are two. "e attribute of being “two” belongs to them, 
but not to each of them; it is instantiated only in Socrates and Hippias together. It is the 
context that makes them two, the context of considering Hippias and Socrates, and no 
other. In this context they, no more and no fewer, are two.
"e metaphysics of the Socratic position
Socrates’ metaphysical account of plural-predication is explicit. In plural-predication 
the predicated attribute belongs to all the subjects together; this belonging is not reduci-
ble to, nor does it need to be grounded on, that very attribute belonging to each of the 
individual subjects. Plato says, “when each of them is inexpressible, both together may 
be expressible, or possibly inexpressible” (Hippias Major 303 b 7–c 1). If they are 
expressible together, this is not grounded on individual expressibility if each of them is 
inexpressible. Let us further consider two colors; each is attractive and both together 
unattractive. Hippias could hold that we are justi!ed in saying that the colors are attrac-
tive (in a distributive sense), since each is attractive. But it is also true that juxtaposed 
together, the colors are unattractive. "e attribute of being unattractive belongs to them 
together, but does not belong to each individually, contra Hippias. "is is what is dis-
tinctive of the Socratic position: his metaphysics allows that several individuals together 
can be the subjects of a single instance of an attribute (“unattractive”), which may not be 
instantiated in each individual; and an attribute instantiated in each individual (“attrac-
tive”) may not be instantiated jointly in all of them together (although it can be collec-
tively attributed to them in a distributive (Hippian) way). A plural instantiation can 
coexist, as a di#erent instantiation of an attribute, with instances of the same attribute in 
each of the subjects, as when each color is attractive, but also, they are all attractive, too. 
Alternatively, it can coexist with its opposite, as when the colors are unattractive 
together, despite each of them being attractive; in such a case, each color possesses an 
attribute (“attractiveness”) which they do not possess together, and they possess an 
attribute together (“unattractiveness”) which neither of them possesses by itself.
"is ontological independence of plural-predication from individual-predication is 
just what Hippias denied when he said, “how could that be, Socrates? "at any state of 
being, whatever, could be attributed to neither, since that attribute, which is attributed 
to neither, is attributed to both?” (300 b 6–8). Socrates does have an answer; he says 
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Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato 7
that “it was by the being that adheres to both, if both are [ f ] . . . —it was by that they had 
to be [ f ], . . . and not by what falls o# one or the other” (302 c 4–7, my emphasis). "is 
attribute does not make each of them f: if “that attribute adheres in both, but not in 
each . . . then that’s not what makes each of them [ f ]; . . . it doesn’t adhere in each” (302 e 
5–10).
How does a color’s possession of attractiveness, which it possesses together with 
another color, di#er from the color’s possession of attractiveness all by itself? "e met-
aphysical innovation of Socrates is that a single instance of an attribute can be shared by 
a number of subjects; the instance is literally shared between the subjects; they co- 
possess it; they co-own that instance of the attribute. I do not use the terms “part-own,” 
or “part-possess,” as they may mislead by suggesting that there are parts of the attrib-
ute, each of which is fully possessed by each of the subjects respectively.3 A plurally 
shared attribute belongs to each individual subject di"erently than the way that attrib-
ute would belong to any one of these subjects if fully possessed by that subject alone. 
Shared ownership involves only all the sharing-subjects together possessing the attrib-
ute. It is like a statue being supported by two pillars. "e statue is not partitioned so that 
one part of it stands on one pillar and the other part on the second; nor does the statue 
stand on the !rst pillar, or even on the second; rather, the statue stands as a whole on 
the two pillars. Without either of the pillars, the statue would fall; the whole statue 
would fall, not just part of it. In an alternative set-up, the statue could be supported by 
several pillars and not fall by the removal of one or more of them, but only come to be 
fully supported by fewer of them. Similarly, with the many owners of an instance of an 
attribute. In the case of their being “two people,” the loss of one would be detrimental 
to the plural-instantiation of that attribute, but if they are so many as to form “a crowd,” 
the loss of one would not undermine the plural-predication of “a crowd.”
For Socrates, quali!cations can come to belong to particular things in two ways, 
the way Hippias described, distributively, but also the way Hippias denied, plurally 
(shared):
If they come to belong to both, they do to each also; and if to each, to both—all the examples 
that you [Hippias] gave. . . . But the examples I [Socrates] gave were not that way.
(Hippias Major 303 a 5–10)
And the Socratic type of plural, non-distributive predication, can occur together with 
individual-predication:
"en they [the !ne things] have some thing that itself makes them be !ne, that common thing 
[i.e. the Form of Fine] that belongs to both of them in common, and to each privately. Because 
I don’t suppose there’s any other way they would both and each be !ne.
(Hippias Major 300 a 9–b 2)
(It is interesting here that Plato seems to be introducing a linguistic criterion for the 
distinction between distributive and plural-predication, e.g. not the Hippian “they are 
3 Plato does consider partitioning of attributes in the Parmenides (130 e–131 e) but rejects it.
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!ne,” but the Socratic “they are jointly !ne.”) "e Socratic type of plural-predication 
can alternatively occur without individual predication of the same attribute:
[Socratic hypothesis:] Doesn’t that attribute [the !ne] adhere in both, but not in each? . . . "en 
that’s not what makes each of them !ne; it doesn’t adhere in each. So the [Socratic] hypothesis 
lets us call both of them !ne, but it doesn’t let us call each of them !ne.
(Hippias Major 302 e 5–303 a 1)
In both Socratic cases of plural-predication, the instance of the attribute which quali-
!es jointly the many as f is di#erent from any individual instances of it in each of the 
many. Although it is “textually underdetermined” what the ontology of the cases where 
Socrates agrees with Hippias’s examples is, I have tried to shed light on the ontological 
di#erence between the two for Socrates, premised on whether the collective attribu-
tion involves or not a shared attribute. (Plato’s position could have been more thor-
oughly developed in the text with correlations between linguistic forms and distributive 
versus plural attributions of collective quali!cation. For instance, correlating more 
explicitly an attribution such as “they are tall” with distributive predication, and an 
attribution such as “they are vivacious” with plural-predication, if they are jointly viva-
cious.) "e complex ontological account presented above is required to explain the 
intricate semantics of plural-predication in language through the "eory of Forms.
Related individuals in Plato’s "eory of Forms
Plato’s "eory of Forms is designed to o#er the metaphysics of predication by showing 
what it is for an object to be quali!ed in any way. An object is f  by partaking in Form F:
Is there or is there not an absolute justice? Assuredly there is. And an absolute beauty and 
absolute good? Of course. (Phaedo 65 d 4–8)
"ey agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in 
these get their names from them. (Phaedo 102 a 10–b 1)
"e individuals get their names from them, but also they become like the Form in 
which they partake:
If there is anything beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it 
shares in that Beauty. . . . nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the shar-
ing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beauty we mentioned, for I will not 
insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all things are made beautiful by Beauty.
(Phaedo 100 c 4–d 8)
Forms are transcendent entities, which, notoriously, make partaking in them a theo-
retically challenging problem for the theory. But this will not be our concern here. It is 
a di#erent aspect of the Forms that is of direct interest in our present inquiry, namely, 
what it is that a Form can o#er to an individual that partakes in it, however the partak-
ing is achieved.
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Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato 9
Forms are of a single kind, monoeidic. "is means that when an individual partakes 
of a Form F, all that the Form can do for that individual is to qualify it as an f. Plato is 
explicit in stating that Forms are monoeidic, each standing for a single kind:
Can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be a#ected by any 
change whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform [monoeides] by itself, 
remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever? (Phaedo 78 d 3–7)
"is does not mean that a Form has no further properties. It means that there is a single 
property that a Form stands for, which is the only property it can endow to its 
partakers.
"e same is true when plural-subjects partake together in a Form: the partaking 
endows the subjects with a single instance of a single attribute—the one the Form 
stands for –which belongs jointly to these subjects together. "us, an individual or 
individuals partaking in a Form will be quali!ed with the kind that Form is, namely the 
single property that constitutes the Form, for example Justice, Beauty, Goodness, Heat, 
Smallness etc. Joint ownership of an instance of a property is like joint ownership of a 
book—there is only one book but more than one owner of it.
"ere are two problems that arise for a theory of related individuals based on the 
ontology of the "eory of Forms. "e !rst is that qualifying a partaker does not relate 
the partaker to anything and the second is that each Form can qualify its partaker(s) 
with a single quali!cation, while asymmetric relations qualify their relata with di"erent 
quali!cations.
I !nd the monoeidic (uni-form) character of the Forms to be the determining factor 
for whatever treatment of asymmetrically related objects can be given in Plato’s ontol-
ogy. "is is so because the monoeidic nature of the Forms prevents the Forms from 
standing for asymmetric relations. Asymmetric relations qualify their relata with dif-
ferent quali!cations. For instance, the asymmetric teacher-student relation takes indi-
viduals as relata, and quali!es one with the role of the teacher and the other with the 
role of their student. "ere can be no Form in Plato’s "eory of Forms which could do 
the same for the particulars that partook in the Form. "ere can be a Form of Teacher, 
or a Form of Student; but no individuals that partook in either Form could be thereby 
quali!ed with the roles of teacher to student. Furthermore, although some individuals 
could be quali!ed as students by partaking in the Form of Student and others as teach-
ers by partaking in the Form of Teacher, they would not be thereby related to each other 
as teachers to their students.
Generally, partaking in Forms quali#es but does not relate partakers; and the 
monoeidic character of Forms results in there being no Form in Plato’s theory which 
would qualify its partakers with di#erent quali!cations. "is, then, gives rise to the 
question of how Plato could explain the ontology of related individuals and, even more 
challenging, the ontology of asymmetrically related individuals in the "eory of Forms, 
if he has only qualifying (non-relational) monoeidic Forms at his disposal.
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I will argue that Plato does identify the question of the ontology of symmetrically 
and asymmetrically related individuals, and that the problem can be addressed in his 
ontology, not via introducing sui-generis relational Forms, which Plato does not, but 
via plural-predication in monadic Forms and in Forms of Opposites. "is is a special 
version of plural-partaking in Forms that could address the problem of symmetrically 
and asymmetrically related objects. We shall !rst look at Plato’s description of asym-
metrically related objects, because both ontological problems of asymmetry and of 
relatedness arise with respect to them.
Plato discusses the ontology of asymmetric relations in his dialogue the Phaedo. He 
o#ers examples of comparative relatives. He considers individuals that di#er between 
them by being bigger or smaller than one another:
It is through Largeness that large things are large and larger things are larger, and . . . smaller 
things are made small by Smallness. (Phaedo 100 e 5–6)
According to the "eory of Forms, if an individual is quali!ed as large, it is so quali!ed 
on account of its partaking in the Form of Largeness and, correspondingly, with small 
individuals partaking in the Form of Smallness. "is is in line with the monoeidic 
character of the Forms. (We assume that an individual that is larger than another is, by 
that token, also large, at least in that context.)
Proceeding, Plato examines the relativity of asymmetrically related objects. He 
begins with the following problem:
When you say that Simmias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, do you not say 
that there is in Simmias largeness and smallness? (Phaedo 102 b #.)
"is raises for Plato the problem of how something large can be small, since they are 
antithetical quali!cations. "e solution he !nds is to identify (to my knowledge, for the 
!rst time in the history of metaphysics) the contingency and so non-intrinsicness of 
some of the properties that qualify an individual:
Do you agree that the words of the statement “Simmias is larger than Socrates” do not express 
the truth of the matter? It is not, surely, the nature of Simmias to be larger than Socrates because 
he is Simmias but because of the largeness he happens to have? Nor is he larger than Socrates 
because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness compared with [pros] the 
largeness of the other?
True.
Nor is he [Simmias] smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo 
has largeness compared with the smallness of Simmias?
"at is so. (Phaedo 102 b 8–c 9)
What this explanation introduces is a distinction between what it is to be a particular 
individual, say Simmias, and the quali!cations Simmias may happen to have which 
are not aspects of being that individual, of his nature. It is not in the nature of 
Simmias to be larger than Socrates, but this is only a contingent feature of Simmias. 
Plato introduces the following criterion for distinguishing between contingent and 
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non- contingent quali!cations: “I admit and endure smallness and still remain the 
same person and am this small man” (Phaedo 102 e 2–5)."is criterion licenses the 
counterfactual test for the distinction between an individual’s nature and its contingent 
properties—for example, if I was quali!ed as large, I would be the same person I am. 
Plato does not o#er further explanation in the text for us to be able to tell whether he 
believes that the largeness of Simmias is not an aspect of the nature of Simmias 
(of being a person), or whether he believes that largeness is not an aspect of his identity 
(of being Simmias)—there are indications in Plato’s language for both. "ese meta-
physical distinctions can be studied in the more precise treatment of the conceptions 
of “essential nature” and of “individual” in Aristotle’s system.
Plato detects and addresses the relativity of contingent asymmetric quali!cations, 
which is due to the circumstantial conditions of the related individuals:
"en Simmias is called small and large, being between the two [Phaedo and Socrates], present-
ing his smallness to be overcome by the largeness of one [Phaedo], and his largeness to over-
come the shortness of the other [Socrates].4 (Phaedo 102 c 10–d 2, my emphasis)
Having established that largeness and smallness are not in the nature of each of the 
compared individuals, Plato turns to the context in which these quali!cations emerge. 
Each individual is quali!ed as large or small, not in itself, but only in comparison to 
another individual. "us, Simmias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo 
because it so happens. Simmias has largeness, not in himself, as Simmias, but in com-
parison to Socrates’ smallness, and has smallness in comparison to Phaedo’s largeness.
Plato even becomes graphic in his description of the contingency and relativity of the 
comparison in this context:
One of two things must take place: either the largeness in us $ees, or withdraws when its oppo-
site, smallness, advances toward it, or it is destroyed by the opposites’ approach. . . . either it goes 
away or is destroyed when that happens. (Phaedo 102 d–103 a, my emphasis)
What is signi!cant for our own purposes in this description is that the partaking in 
Largeness or Smallness is temporary and contextual. Simmias’s largeness surpasses the 
smallness of Socrates, while his smallness is surpassed by the largeness of Phaedo. 
What Plato is emphasizing is that the presence of largeness or smallness in an individ-
ual is circumstantial, and dictated not by the individual’s nature, but by the context. 
"e contextuality of the relative quali!cations is expressed in Plato’s theory, not in a 
4 "is also introduces the comparison of the sizes of the individuals. But Plato does not generalize this 
into a metaphysics of quantity, in the way that Aristotle will, as he is focusing on Forms of Opposites. 
Forms of Quantities, such as so much weight, or such and such a height would raise problems of their own 
in the "eory of Forms, which Plato does not seem willing to introduce. An indication of this is that he 
immediately says, a>er the quoted sentence: “And he [Socrates] laughed and said, ‘I seem to be speaking 
like a legal document, but it really is very much as I say.’ ” "e claim of legal fastidiousness is only to indicate 
that he was already being overly meticulous in his ontological description. Nevertheless, it may be that 
quantitative quali!cations are unavoidable in a complete account of the theory. More generally, Plato does 
not develop a theory of what occasions or grounds partaking in Forms.
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relation between Opposite Forms, but in the joint partaking by the two individuals 
(which is developed in what follows).
Symmetrically related individuals: the Form of Equality
I read Plato in the conventional and common-sense way of understanding the Form 
of Equality just like all other Forms, as a single transcendent property rather than as 
two equal entities.5 What is it, then, for a thing to be equal? It can only be equal to 
another thing, which, too, is equal to the !rst. But how is this to be explained in terms 
of the "eory of Forms? Plato does not discuss this explicitly, but one can surmise its 
ontology from similar cases that are discussed by him.
It is the relativity and contextuality of the equality between two individuals which 
invites comparison to Plato’s treatment of similarly relative cases of quali!cation; spe-
ci!cally, that of being two, or of some objects being attractive or harmonious together. 
We saw above that Plato’s explanation of Socrates and Hippias being two is that they 
both share the quali!cation of “being two,” which we explained in the "eory of Forms 
by the plural-partaking of the individuals in the Form of Two. Further, Plato’s explana-
tion of two objects looking beautiful together is that they share the quali!cation of 
beauty, for which they need to plurally partake in the Form of Beauty. We have seen 
that what is particular about such partaking is that the individuals partake together, 
namely, they share a single instance of the Form’s property. "us, it is not Socrates that 
is two and Hippias that is two, but only both of them together bear the property of 
twoness. Similarly, for example, these objects are, by hypothesis, beautiful together.
My proposal is that plural-partaking o"ers a way of understanding the way in which 
related individuals partake of Forms, given the absence of relational Forms. "is is 
more directly evident in the case of symmetric relations. I take it that equal individuals 
partake in the Form of Equality in the way that two individuals partake in the Form of 
Twoness. "ey partake plurally, together, while none of these individuals bears the 
Form’s property on its own, but only jointly with its co-partaking partner. In this way 
individuals are equal together.
If I am right, there is an important and challenging question that arises. Two equal 
things are equal together. Is this the same as being equal to one another? Furthermore, 
is sharing a property an appropriate way of thinking of related individuals?
Let us consider two individuals which are beautiful together, but not singly. How 
does this quali!cation di#er in type from two individuals which are equal together? 
I suggest that they are the same type of quali!cation, and that this is a di"erent way of 
conceiving of relations than the way in which they have traditionally been understood. 
We are accustomed to thinking of relations as “arches” between objects. Could it be 
5 For a criticism of considering the Form of the Equal as a pair of Forms, see Matthen’s discussion of 
H.-N. Castañeda’s “Plato’s ‘Phaedo’ "eory of Relations” in M. Matthen, “Relationality in Plato’s Metaphysics: 
Reply to McPherran,” Phronesis 29 (1984): 304–12.
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that Plato did not think of them in this way? Could it be that he thought of two equal 
individuals as being quali#ed together as equal? "at he thought that the way they 
relate to each other does not connect them, but quali#es them in some way? Is this how 
we, too, think of individuals when we classify them into equivalence classes—for 
example, all A-students? Are A-students related to one another or jointly quali!ed?
Consider things that are beautiful and things that are equal, where none of them 
is beautiful or equal on its own. "e beautiful things are beautiful because of how they 
each relate aesthetically to the other; the equal things are equal because of how 
they each relate quantitatively to the other. And yet we do not think of being beautiful 
as a relation. It is possible that this is how Plato thought of related individuals, namely 
as group-quali#cations of individuals which together are f, even if none of them is f 
individually. Consider individuals which are heavy (for an elevator), and individuals 
which are equal. "eir weights, each weight with the other weights, ground the indi-
viduals’ heaviness in the one case, and their (say) sizes ground their equality, to each 
other, in the second. "e individuals who are heavy are plurally heavy; doesn’t this 
make the equals plurally equal?
One may remark on the di#erence between the equals being equal to each other, 
while heavy things being heavy with each other. But the question is not whether they 
are di#erently related, which is not disputable; rather, it is whether they are quali!ed 
with categorically di#erent types of quali!cation (as relational and non-relational).
"eir di#erence seems irrelevant for the categorical classi!cation of the quali!cation: 
are two harmonious sounds harmonious in relation “to” one another or are they har-
monious “with” one another? More generally, we do not think that “over,” “in,” “on the 
side of, ” “with,” etc. signal di#erent ontological categories of the respective quali!ca-
tions. Why should the di#erence between “to” and “with” signify a categorical di#er-
ence of the respective quali!cations? I suggest that it does not, and that Plato did 
not see, for example, being two (with one another) as a categorically di#erent type of 
quali!cation than being equal (to one another).
"e intuition that Plato develops is that we can capture the dependence of related 
individuals, not by connecting them through “bridges” between them, i.e. relations, 
but by their joint partaking, which results in their sharing a quali!cation. A shared 
quali!cation introduces the oneness of the quali!cation which is owned by more sub-
jects than one and which embodies the dependence between the subjects. "eir 
dependence results from the requirement that the partaking that will secure such a 
quali!cation for them all needs to be joint partaking. Joint partaking represents 
dependence, even in less conspicuously relational plural quali!cations such as “being 
two,” or “beautiful” (together), or “harmonious,” or “heavy,” or “equal,” etc.
Asymmetrically related individuals
I derive the solution for asymmetrically related individuals proposed below from Plato’s 
description of “Simmias . . . being between the two [Phaedo and Socrates],  presenting 
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his smallness to be overcome by the largeness of one [Phaedo], and his largeness to 
overcome the shortness of the other [Socrates]” (Phaedo 102 c 10 –d 2). What does 
it mean that the largeness of Simmias overcomes the shortness of Socrates? How can 
largeness be compared to shortness? I suggest that Plato sees opposites on the model of 
the hot and the cold—they are comparable because they can compromise each other: 
when one adds hot and cold water together one gets lukewarm water. "is means that 
the di#erence between the opposites is reduced to a di#erence of value and strength, 
rather than a di#erence of quality. Generalizing, the di#erence between opposites is a 
di#erence of the quantity in a qualitative common scale between them, which allows 
for opposites to be compared and to overpower one another. "is presupposed com-
mon qualitative ground, which reduces the di#erence between Opposite Forms to 
quantity, is the key to plural-partaking in Opposite Forms. It also sets Opposite Forms 
apart from non-Opposite Forms which di#er qualitatively between them.
"e ontology of asymmetrically related individuals is, expectedly, more complex 
than of symmetrically related ones, but I suggest that they are handled by Plato in the 
same way: as joint-quali!cations resulting from plural-partaking in Forms. "is is 
what follows from the realization that opposites are comparable, as explained above: 
the di#erence of two opposite quali!cations in a comparative context is a di#erence of 
degree, rather than of quality. It is as if Opposite Forms stand for a common qualitative 
character and they di#er quantitatively. Hence, partaking in Opposite Forms can be 
plural in so far as it quali!es individuals with the same type of qualitative state; it also 
needs to be partaking in two Forms rather than a single one, because the quali!cations 
of the partaking individuals here are quantitatively di"erent (as opposed to quali!ca-
tions resulting from plural-partaking in a single Form, as e.g. with equal individuals 
partaking jointly in the Form of Equality). Asymmetrically related individuals need to 
plurally partake in more than one Form.
"us if A and B are two objects where A is hotter than B, A and B plurally partake of 
the Form of the Hot and the Form of the Cold: A partakes of the Form of the Hot while 
B partakes of the Form of the Cold, and they thereby come to share the same type 
of qualitative states—of temperature—only in di#erent strengths each. "us plural- 
partaking in Opposite Forms results in the individuals sharing a common qualitative 
state, but to a di#erent degree each, by acquiring their states from di#erent Opposite 
Forms.
Importantly, I am not suggesting that plural-partaking in Forms of Opposites is 
a  condition for participating in Opposites. For Plato, an object can participate 
non-comparatively in an Opposite Form, for example, of the Just. "us, Socrates is 
just, namely, he has a harmonious rational soul, independently of the state of the soul 
of anyone else. But Socrates was also more just than Phaedo. In the !rst context, the 
predication of “being just” is not comparative, and Socrates’ partaking in the Form of 
the Just is individual-partaking. In the latter case, the context is comparative: Socrates 
is more just than Phaedo; the two subjects partake plurally of the Forms of Justice and 
Injustice. "is means that they both have harmonious souls, but to di#erent degrees 
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of harmony each. Hence, we see that for Plato, quali!cations from the Forms of 
Opposites can be independent of each other in some contexts and relative to one 
another for other contexts; in the !rst case, there is individual-partaking in the 
Opposites, and in the relative case, plural-partaking. Which of the two kinds of par-
taking occurs in each case is determined contextually, not by a metaphysical bonding 
between Opposite Forms.
"ere is therefore a subtle di#erence between plural-partaking in the Form of 
Twoness or Beauty or Equality, and plural-partaking in a pair of Opposite Forms such 
as the Forms of the Large and the Small. "e di#erence is that Socrates and Hippias 
share a single instance of the Form of Twoness, by partaking jointly in it. But Simmias 
and Socrates do not share an instance of a single Form; they share a pair of relatively 
determined instances of Opposite Forms in that context; they do so by each individual 
acquiring an instance of a respective Opposite relative to the other. Is this plural- 
partaking? I wish to claim that it is and that this is an asset in the "eory of Forms.
What the "eory of Forms cannot do is provide a single Form that quali!es both 
relata, the larger and the smaller. Yet, what it can provide is paired large-small quali!-
cations. I take this pairing to be characteristic of plural-predication, not because the 
instantiated quali!cation is single, shared between the partakers, but because the par-
takings are paired. In the standard case of plural-predication, it is a single instance of a 
property that is shared between the plurally partaking individuals. At best, in the case 
of related individuals, there is a sense in which what is shared is a generic character that 
two Opposite Forms represent (if not embody) for example, for the Hot and the Cold 
being thermal. "is is not in Plato. But what is in Plato, as we saw above, is the interde-
pendence of partaking in pairs of Opposites in comparative contexts. Since there are no 
Forms of Larger and Smaller, the interdependence of these quali!cations can be meta-
physically cashed out only through the interdependence of the partakings that engen-
der them. Such interdependence of partaking stems from the nature of the Opposite 
Forms, and is occasioned in comparative contexts where, for example, something cold 
is colder than something hotter. It follows that relations can be explained in the "eory 
of Forms through Opposite Forms, or, put di#erently, Opposite Forms would need to 
be assumed to explain any relation.
"e interdependence is not rei!ed in the "eory of Forms, for example, either 
through comparative Forms like Hotter and Colder, or through a generic Form of 
Temperature (or thermal state). It is represented ontologically in the interdependence 
of the partakings in the Hot and in the Cold, in comparative contexts. I take this inter-
dependence to be the sense in which the partaking by Simmias and Socrates of the 
Form of Large and the Form of Small respectively is plural, that it is a joint partaking: 
partaking in a pair of Opposites is plural because interdependent, because the opposite 
quali!cations of the partaking individuals are relative to each other. What we saw indi-
cated in Plato’s text is the interdependence of the quali!cations; what I am suggesting is 
that this interdependence cannot be captured ontologically in meta-Forms about the 
Forms, but can be captured in the “joint-ness” of the partaking by the two individuals 
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in the Opposite Forms. "is type of interdependence was already present in the reper-
toire of Plato’s "eory of Forms before he addressed relations.6
"ere is further indication that Plato saw the relativity of Opposite Forms, arising as 
interdependence, despite his not positing meta-Forms to reify their interdependence. 
He says in the Parmenides (133 c 7–e 3) “those ideas which are what they are relative 
to each other have their nature relative to one another. . . . mastery itself is what it is of 
slavery itself, and likewise slavery itself is slavery to mastery itself ” (my emphasis). 
Although Plato does not discuss cases of ordered pairs, by extension from examples 
such as the present one we could assume that he would handle them by positing the 
respective Opposite Forms in his ontology (as he did for things that are colder than 
others). For example, having a Form of Lover and a Form of Loved would enable him 
to account for the ordered relation of “Chloe loving Daphnis” through their joint par-
ticipation in that pair of Opposites.7 Aristotle captured the interdependence of rela-
tives in terms of counterfactual dependencies on each other, for example, between 
a master and a slave or, as above, between greater and smaller. Aristotle handled it 
through ontological dependence between monadic properties, while Plato through 
partaking in pairs of monadic Forms—Opposites. I have tried to show that we should 
understand such partaking as joint partaking, in the sense “plural-partaking” in di#er-
ent Forms by di#erent individuals, resulting in quali!cations that are interdependent, 
just as plurally partaking individuals that share a single property; for example, two 
become, thereby, interdependently quali!ed.
Conclusion
Much of the subtlety of the "eory of Forms is lost if we do not recognize that Plato 
distinguished between two di#erent types of partaking in the Forms: single-partaking 
and plural-partaking. Plural-partaking captures the relativity of the resulting quali#ca-
tion(s) through the joint metaphysical function of partaking occasioned in that con-
text. In plural-partaking in the same Form, the relativity is captured also by the shared 
quali!cation. Symmetrically related individuals partake plurally in the same Form. We 
can understand asymmetrically related individuals as partaking plurally in pairs of 
Opposite Forms. We can thus associate plural predication more broadly with the fol-
lowing types of quali!cation: “being harmonious,” “being suitable,” “equal,” “being a 
spouse,” “a teacher,” “being the leader,” “being hotter,” etc.
I have tried to show that the nature of plural-partaking, namely the interdependence 
of the partakings, reAects the relativity of the resulting quali!cations of the partaking 
individuals, whether in Hippias and Socrates being two, or in Simmias being larger 
than Socrates. In the case of asymmetrically related individuals, the interdependence 
6 In the case of distributive predication there is no interdependence of quali!cations.
7 For a contemporary discussion of similarity and ordered pairs in relation to plural universals see 
Hossack, !e Metaphysics of Knowledge pp. 37–40.
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of the quali!cations cannot be derived from the ontology of the Opposite Forms they 
participate in. It is not an ontological connection between the Forms8 that signals rela-
tivity in the theory of Forms. Rather, joint partaking in one or more Forms suBces to 
capture the relativity of the quali!cations, even when there is no shared single instance 
of a property between them.
Appendix on Castañeda’s reading
Plato’s theory of related individuals has not attracted much discussion in the exegetical tradi-
tion. More recently, there was a focused discussion of Castañeda’s reading of Plato on relations,9 
which triggered responses and criticisms by Gallop, McPherran, and Matthen.10 Castañeda’s 
reading is fundamentally di#erent from the present one, in so far as he premises it on a position 
that is antithetical to my position here, but also, a position I have argued is not Platonic. 
Castañeda’s theory is based on the claim that
All Forms are monadic, i.e., each Form is instantiated only by one particular in each fact it is 
involved in: no Form is ever instantiated by pairs or other n-tuples, whether ordered or not.11
"is is a Aat denial of the possibility of plural-partaking in a Form, which I have shown to be 
contradicted by Plato’s account of plural-subjects. One apparent similarity between 
Castañeda’s interpretation and the present one is that he holds that related individuals partake in 
chained-Forms, for example, Hot-Cold. But for Castañeda, nothing can partake in the Cold 
alone. Rather it must do so while something else partakes of the Hot. "is has several ontological 
consequences for the Forms, which Matthen has itemized in his criticisms of Castañeda’s 
account.12 But the starkest problem I !nd in Castañeda’s reading is that he avoids positing rela-
tions between things in the world only at the cost of introducing relations at the level of the 
Forms—relations which chain some Forms together, and which are not explained by the "eory 
of Forms. Apart from the explanatory gap this generates, it is also antithetical to Castañeda’s 
claim that Platonic Forms are monadic. Castañeda says,
Plato (as does my [Castañeda’s] general theory) reduces relations to special sets of monadic 
Forms, but does not reduce relational facts to non-relational facts. . . . "us, it can be said that 
Plato (as well as my general theory) assimilates relations to monadic properties or qualities—in 
making them all monadic—even though he distinguishes (as I do) between the non-relational 
monadic properties, which can be participated in by particulars in isolation, and the relational 
8 As per H.-N. Castañeda, “Plato’s ‘Phaedo’ "eory of Relations,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972): 
467–80.
9 H.-N. Castañeda, “Plato’s ‘Phaedo’ "eory of Relations”; and H.-N. Castañeda, “Plato’s Relations, Not 
Essences or Accidents, at Phaedo 102 b 2–d 2,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1978): 39–53.
10 D. Gallop, “Relations in the Phaedo,” in New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics, eds Roger 
Shiner and John King-Farlow, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 2 (1976): 149–63; 
M. L. McPherran, “Matthen on Castañeda and Plato’s Treatment of Relational Statements in the Phaedo,” 
Phronesis 28 (1983): 298–306; and Matthen, “Relationality in Plato’s Metaphysics.”
11 H.-N. Castañeda, “Plato’s ‘Phaedo’ "eory of Relations,” 471.
12 M. Matthen, “Relationality in Plato’s Metaphysics.”
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ones, which cannot be participated in except in company, with respect to the partakings of 
other Forms.13
It is clear that Castañeda requires second level relations in the realm of the Forms, in order to 
explain the nature of the bonding between Opposite Forms. Such relations would function as 
meta-Forms, whose partakers would be !rst level Opposite Forms. But such relational meta-
Forms would fully undermine the Platonic program of rendering relations as monadic proper-
ties through the "eory of Forms. Not positing such relational meta-Forms would leave 
Castañeda’s account with no explanation for the relational bonding of Opposite Forms, which is 
a fundamental gap, in view of the overall aim of Plato’s ontology of monadic Forms, which 
Castañeda recognizes.
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